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There is something about mathematics that is universal, irrespective of race, culture 
or social context. For instance, no mathematician will accept the following “proof”, 
offered as a “joke-proof” by Oscar Perron (1880-1975) but not without pedagogical 
purpose: 
“Theorem”:  1 is the largest natural number. 
“Proof”:  Suppose N is the largest natural number, then N2 
cannot exceed N, so NNNN  2)1(  is not positive. This 
means that 1N  is not positive, or that N cannot exceed 1. 
But N is at least 1. Hence, 1N .  Q.E.D. 
 
 
Likewise, well-known paradoxes on argumentation exist in both the Western and the 
Eastern world. The famous Liar Paradox, embodied in the terse but intriguing remark “I 
am a liar”, is ascribed to the 4th century B.C.E. Greek philosopher Eubulides of Miletus. 
A similar flavour is conveyed in the famous shield-and-halberd story told by the Chinese 
philosopher Hon Fei Zi (Book 15, Section XXXVI, Hon Fei Zi, c.3
rd
 Century B.C.E.): 
“My shields are so solid that nothing can penetrate them. 
My halberds are so sharp that they can penetrate anything.” 
“How about using your halberds to pierce through your 
shields?” 
 
In the Chinese language the term “mao dun”, literally “halberd and shield”, is used to 
mean “contradiction”. Indeed, Hon Fei Zi used this story as an analogy to prove that the 
Confucianist School was inadequate while the Legalist School was effective and hence 
superior
1
. His proof is by reductio ad absurdum. 
 
In his book A Mathematician’s Apology, English mathematician Godfrey Harold 
Hardy (1877-1947) said that “reductio ad absurdum, which Euclid loved so much, is one 
of a mathematician’s finest weapons” (Hardy, 1940/1967, p. 94). Many people are led by 
this remark to see the technique of proof by contradiction as a Western practice, even to 
the extent that they wonder whether the technique is closely related to Greek, and hence 
Western, culture. I was once asked whether Chinese students would have inherent 
difficulty in learning proof by contradiction, because such argumentation was absent 
from traditional Chinese mathematics. My immediate response was that this learning 
difficulty shows up in a majority of students, Chinese or non-Chinese, and does not seem 
to be related to a student’s cultural background. Nonetheless, this query urged me to look 
for examples of proof by contradiction in traditional Chinese thinking. Since then, I have 
gathered some examples, many of which are in a non-mathematical context. One 
mathematical presentation that approaches a proof by contradiction is Liu Hui’s (c. 3rd 
century C.E.) argument in his commentary on Chapter 1 of Jiu Zhang Suan Shu (Nine 
Chapters on the Mathematical Art) explaining why the ancients were wrong in taking 3 
to be the ratio of the perimeter of a circle to its diameter (Siu, 1993, p. 348). Still, I have 
                                                 
1
 The Confucianist School  and the Legalist School were two streams of thought in ancient China, which 
would be too vast a subject to be explained, even in brief, here. If suffices to point out that the Legalist 
School maintained that good government was based on law and authority instead of on special ability and 
high virtue of the ruler who set an exemplar to influence the people. In particular, the story of shields and 
halberds was employed to stress that the two legendary leaders, Yao and Shun, whom the Confucianist 
School extolled as sage-kings, could not be both held in high regard.  
not yet found a written proof in an ancient Chinese text that recognizably follows 
prominently and distinctly the Greek fashion of reductio ad absurdum.  
 
However, the notion of a proof is not so clear-cut when it comes to different cultures 
as well as different historical epochs. Mathematics practiced in different cultures and in 
different historical epochs may have its respective different styles and emphases. For the 
sake of learning and teaching it will be helpful to study such differences.  
 
Unfortunately, many Western mathematicians have come to regard Eastern 
mathematical traditions as not ‘real’ mathematics. For example, take Hardy’s assessment: 
The Greeks were the first mathematicians who are still 
‘real’ to us to-day. Oriental mathematics may be an 
interesting curiosity, but Greek mathematics is the real 
thing. The Greeks first spoke a language which modern 
mathematicians can understand; as Littlewood said to 
me once, they are not clever schoolboys or ‘scholarship 
candidates’, but ‘Fellows of another college’. (Hardy, 
1940/1967, pp. 80-81) 
 
However, proper study of the different traditions leads one to disagree with Hardy’s 
assessment. 
 
A typical example of the cross-cultural difference in style and emphasis is the age-old 
result known in the Western world as Pythagoras’ Theorem. Compare the proof given in 
Proposition 47, Book I of Euclid’s Elements (c. 3rd century B.C.E.) (Figure 1) and that 
given by the Indian mathematician Bhaskara in the 12
th
 century C.E. (Figure 2). The 
former is a deductive argument with justification provided at every step. The latter is a 
visually clear dissect-and-reassemble procedure, so clear that Bhaskara found it adequate 
to simply qualify the argument by a single word, “Behold!”  
 
 
 
 
Euclid’s proof of Pythagoras’ Theorem Bhaskara’s proof of Pythagoras’ Theorem 
Fig. 1 Fig. 2 
 
 
In her plenary address (this volume), Judith Grabiner noted how the notion of proof 
permeates other human endeavour in the Western world. Indeed, one finds the following 
passage in Book1.10 in Institutio Oratoria by Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (1
st
 century 
C.E.): 
Geometry [Mathematics] is divided into two parts, one 
dealing with Number, the other with Form. Knowledge 
of numbers is essential not only to the orator, but to 
anyone who has had even a basic education. (…) In the 
first place, order is a necessary element in geometry; is 
it not also in eloquence? Geometry proves subsequent 
propositions from preceding ones, the uncertain from 
the certain: do we not do the same in speaking? Again: 
does not the solution of the problems rest almost wholly 
on Syllogisms? (…) Finally, the most powerful proofs 
are commonly called “linear demonstrations”. And 
what is the aim of oratory if not proof? Geometry also 
uses reasoning to detect falsehoods which appear like 
truths. (…) So, if (as the next book will prove) an orator 
has to speak on all subjects, he cannot be an orator 
without geometry [mathematics]. (Quintilian, 2001, pp. 
231, 233, 237) 
 
Stephen Toulmin, in examining “how far logic can hope to be a formal science, and yet 
retain the possibility of being applied in the critical assessment of actual arguments” 
(Toulmin 1958, p.3), opines that one source from which the notion of proof arose is 
argument on legal matters. He propounds a need for a rapprochement between logic and 
epistemology, for a re-introduction of historical, empirical and even anthropological 
considerations into the subject which philosophers have prided themselves on purifying: 
The patterns of argument in geometrical optics, for 
instance (…) are distinct from the patterns to be found in 
other fields: e.g. in a piece of historical speculation, a 
proof in the infinitesimal calculus, or the case for the 
plaintiff in a civil suit alleging negligence. Broad 
similarities there may be between arguments in different 
fields, (…) it is our business, however, not to insist on 
finding such resemblances at all costs but to keep an eye 
open quite as much for possible differences. (Toulmin, 
1958, p. 256) 
 
 
 This year (2009) is the 200
th
 anniversary of the birth of the great English naturalist 
Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and the 150
th
 anniversary of the publication of On the 
Origin of Species (1859). Not many may have noted what Darwin once said in his 
autobiography about mathematics: 
I attempted mathematics, and even went during the 
summer of 1828 with a private tutor (a very dull man) 
to Barmouth, but I got on very slowly. This work is 
repugnant to me, chiefly from my not being able to see 
any meaning in the early steps in algebra. This 
impatience was very foolish, and in after years I have 
deeply regretted that I did not proceed far enough at 
least to understand something of the great leading 
principles of mathematics, for men thus endowed seem 
to have an extra sense. (Darwin, 1887, Chapter II, 
Volume I, p. 46) 
 
This kind of extra sense shows up in another important historical figure, the American 
polymath Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790). He thought in a precise, rational way even 
about seemingly non-mathematical issues and used mathematical argument for a social 
debate (Pasles, 2008, Chapter 1, Chapter 4).   
 
The same use of mathematical argument in other contexts also happens in the Eastern 
world. For example, the Indian-British scholar and recipient of the 1998 Nobel Prize in 
Economics, Amartya Sen, presents an interesting discussion of the case in India in his 
book The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian Culture, History and Identity (2005). 
 
Next, I draw your attention to two styles in doing mathematics, using terms borrowed 
from Peter Henrici (Henrici, 1974), who labels the two styles as “dialectic” and 
“algorithmic”. Broadly speaking, dialectic mathematics is a rigorously logical science, in 
which “statements are either true or false and objects with specified properties either do 
or do not exist.” (Henrici, 1974, p.80) On the other hand, algorithmic mathematics is a 
tool for solving problems, in which “we are concerned not only with the existence of a 
mathematical object but also with the credentials of its existence” (Henrici, 1974, p. 80). 
In a lecture (July, 2002), I attempted to synthesize the two aspects from a pedagogical 
viewpoint with examples from historical mathematical developments in Western and 
Eastern cultures. In this 19
th
 ICMI Study Conference, I reiterated this theme, focusing on 
proof, and discussed how the two aspects complement and supplement each other in 
proof activity (Siu, 2009b). A procedural (algorithmic) approach helps to prepare more 
solid ground on which to build up conceptual understanding; conversely, better 
conceptual (dialectical) understanding enables one to handle algorithms with more 
facility, or even to devise improved or new algorithms. Like yin and yang in Chinese 
philosophy, these two aspects complement and supplement each other, each containing 
some part of the other.  
 
Several main issues in mathematics education are rooted in understanding these two 
complementary aspects, “dialectic mathematics” and “algorithmic mathematics”.  Those 
issues include: (1) procedural versus conceptual knowledge; (2) process versus object in 
learning theory; (3) computer versus computerless learning environments; (4) “symbolic” 
versus “geometric” emphasis in learning and teaching; and (5) “Eastern” versus 
“Western” learners/teachers. In a seminal paper, Anna Sfard explicates this duality and 
develops it into a deeper model of concept formation through interplay of the 
“operational” and “structural” phases (Sfard, 1991).  
 
Tradition holds that Western mathematics, developed from that of the ancient Greeks, 
is dialectic, while Eastern mathematics, developed from that of the ancient Egyptians, 
Babylonians, Chinese and Indians, is algorithmic. Even if it holds an element of truth as a 
broad statement, under more refined examination this thesis is an over-simplification. 
Karine Chemla has explained this point in detail (Chemla, 1996). In this respect, the other 
two speakers in this plenary panel attend primarily to Chinese mathematical classics. For 
my part, I will discuss the issue with examples from Euclid’s Elements. 
Saul Stahl has summarized the ancient Greek’s contribution to mathematics:  
Geometry in the sense of mensuration of figures was spontaneously 
developed by many cultures and dates to several millennia B.C. The 
science of geometry as we know it, namely, a collection of abstract 
statements regarding ideal figures, the verification of whose validity 
requires only pure reason, was created by the Greeks. (Stahl 1993, p. 1) 
 A systematic and organized presentation of this body of knowledge is found in Euclid’s 
Elements. 
 
Throughout history, many famed Western scholars have recounted the benefit they 
received from learning geometry through reading Euclid’s Elements or some variation 
thereof. For example, Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) wrote in his autobiography: 
At the age of eleven, I began Euclid, with my brother as tutor. This 
was one of the great events of my life, as dazzling as first love. (…) 
I had been told that Euclid proved things, and was much 
disappointed that he started with axioms. At first, I refused to 
accept them unless my brother could offer me some reason for 
doing so, but he said, ‘If you don't accept them, we cannot go on’, 
and as I wished to go on, I reluctantly admitted them pro temp. 
(Russell, 1967, p. 36) 
 
Another example, Albert Einstein (1879-1955), wrote in his autobiography:,  
At the age of twelve I experienced a second wonder of a totally different 
nature: in a little book dealing with Euclidean plane geometry, which 
came into my hands at the beginning of a school year. (…) The lucidity 
and certainty made an indescribable impression upon me. (…) it is 
marvelous enough that man is capable at all to reach such a degree of 
certainty and purity in pure thinking as the Greeks showed us for the first 
time to be possible in geometry. (Schilepp, 1949, pp. 9, 11) 
 
 
That axiomatic and logical aspect of Euclid's Elements has long been stressed. 
However, reasoning put forth by S.D. Agashe (1989) leads one to look at an alternative 
feature of the Elements; namely, right from the start metric geometry plays a key role, not 
just in the exposition but even in the motivation of the book’s design. In addition, there is 
a procedural flavour to the reasoning. 
 
For example, Proposition 14 of Elements, Book II proposes, “To construct a square 
equal to a given rectilineal figure.” The problem of interest is to compare two polygons. 
To achieve the one-dimensional analogue, comparing two straight line segments, is easy; 
one simply overlays one segment on the other and checks whether one segment lies 
completely inside the other or whether the two are equal. This is in fact what Proposition 
3 of Book I attempts: “Given two unequal straight lines, to cut off from the greater a 
straight line equal to the less.” To justify the result, one relies on Postulates 1, 2 and 3. 
The two-dimensional problem is not so straightforward, except for the special case when 
both polygons are squares; in this case, one can compare their areas through a 
comparison of their sides, by placing the smaller square at the lower left corner of the 
larger square. Incidentally, here one needs to invoke Postulate 4. What Proposition 14 of 
Book II sets out to do is to reduce the comparison of two polygons to that of two squares 
(Figure 3). 
 
Proposition 14 of Elements Book II 
Fig. 3 
 
The proof of Proposition 14 of Book II can be divided into two steps: (1) construct a 
rectangle equal (in area) to a given polygon (Figure 4); (2) construct a square equal (in 
area) to a given rectangle  (Figure 5). Note that (1) is already explained through 
Propositions 42, 44 and 45 of Book I, by triangulating the given polygon then converting 
each triangle into a rectangle of equal area. Incidentally, one has to rely on the famous 
(notorious?) Postulate 5 on (non-)parallelism to prove those results. To achieve the 
solution in (2), one makes the preliminary step of converting the given rectangle into an 
L-shaped gnomon of equal area. This is illustrated in Proposition 5 of Book II, “If a 
straight line be cut into equal and unequal segments, the rectangle contained by the 
unequal segment of the whole together with the square on the straight line between the 
points of section is equal to the square on the half.”  
 
  
Construction of a rectangle equal 
(in area) to a given polygon 
Squaring a rectangle 
Fig. 4 Fig. 5 
 
Proposition 5 of Book II asserts that a certain rectangle is equal (in area) to a certain 
gnomon which is a square ( 2c ) minus another square ( 2b ). To finalize step (2), one must 
construct a square ( 2a ) equal to the difference between two squares ( 22 bc  ); or 
equivalently, the square ( 2c ) is a sum of the two squares ( 22 ba  ). This leads naturally to 
Pythagoras’ Theorem, Proposition 47 of Book I, which epitomizes the interdependence 
between shape and number, between geometry and algebra. (For an enlightening 
exposition of Pythagoras’ Theorem in Clairaut’s Eléments de géométrie [1741,1753], see 
(Siu 2009a, pp.106-107.)) In studying this problem to compare two polygons we see how 
algorithmic mathematics blends in with dialectic mathematics in Book I and Book II of 
Elements. 
 However, despite such evidence of parallels between the Western and Eastern 
mathematical traditions, some teachers hesitate to integrate history of mathematics with 
the learning and teaching of mathematics in the classroom. They cite their concern that 
students lack enough knowledge on culture in general to appreciate history of 
mathematics in particular. This is probably true, but one can look at the problem from the 
reverse, seeing the integration of history of mathematics into the day-to-day mathematics 
classes as an opportunity to let students know more about other cultures in general and 
other mathematical traditions in particular. They can thus come into contact with other 
variations in the development of proof and proving. Proof is such an important ingredient 
in a proper education in mathematics that we can ill afford to miss such an opportunity.  
 
Earlier, I suggested (Siu, 2008) four examples that might be used in such teaching. 
The first examines how the exploratory, venturesome spirit of the ‘era of exploration’ in 
the 15th and 16th centuries C.E. influenced the development of mathematical practice in 
Europe. It resulted in a broad change of mentality in mathematical pursuit, not just 
affecting its presentation but, more important, bringing in an exploratory spirit. The 
second example deals with a similar happening in the Orient, though with more emphasis 
on the aspect of argumentation. It describes the influence of the intellectual milieu in the 
period of the Three Kingdoms and the Wei-Jin Dynasties from the 3rd to the 6th 
centuries C.E. in China on mathematical practice as exemplified in the work of Liu Hui. 
The third example, the influence of Daoism on mathematics in ancient China, particularly 
astronomical measurement and surveying from a distance, examines the role religious, 
philosophical (or even mystical) teachings may play in mathematical pursuit. The fourth 
example, the influence of Euclid's Elements in Western culture compared to that in China 
after the first Chinese translation by the Ming Dynasty scholar-minister Xu Guang Qi 
(1562-1633) and the Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) in 1607 points out a kind of 
‘reverse’ influence; namely, how the mathematical thinking may stimulate thinking in 
other areas of human endeavour. As a ‘bonus’, these examples sometimes suggest ways 
to enhance understanding of specific topics in the classroom. 
 
Finally, one benefit of learning proof and proving is important but seldom 
emphasized in Western education, namely, its value in character building. This point had 
been emphasized in the Eastern world rather early, perhaps as a result of the influence of 
the Confucian philosophical heritage. 
 
In an essay on the Chinese translation of the Elements, the co-translator Xu wrote:  
The benefit derived from studying this book [the Elements] is 
many. It can dispel shallowness of those who learn the theory and 
make them think deep. It can supply facility for those who learn 
the method and make them think elegantly. Hence everyone in this 
world should study the book. (…) Five categories of personality 
will not learn from this book: those who are impetuous, those who 
are thoughtless, those who are complacent, those who are envious, 
those who are arrogant. Thus to learn from this book one not only 
strengthens one's intellectual capacity but also builds a moral base. 
(cited in (Siu, 2009a, p. 110)) 
 
Such emphasis on proof for a moral reason still sometimes echoes in modern times. 
As the late Russian mathematics educator Igor Fedorovich Sharygin (1937-2004) once 
put it, “Learning mathematics builds up our virtues, sharpens our sense of justice and our 
dignity, and strengthens our innate honesty and our principles. The life of mathematical 
society is based on the idea of proof, one of the most highly moral ideas in the world.” 
(cited in (Siu, 2009a, p. 110)) 
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